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Brian Bird* Are Al| Charter Rights and Freedoms
Really Non-Absolute?
This article challenges the conventional legal wisdom that no right or freedom in
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is absolute. Section 1 of the Charter
is the most commonly cited source of this wisdom, but this provision merely sets
out the standard that the state must meet to justify a limit on a Charter right or
freedom. Section 1 does not provide advance confirmation that limits satisfying
this standard exist for all Charter rights and freedoms. This interpretation, if
correct, does not automatically render any of the rights or freedoms in the Charter
absolute. Indeed, the standard in section 1 may ultimately capture all of these
rights and freedoms. Nonetheless, this article proposes two candidates for
absolute status: (a) freedoms that concern the internal forum of the person (e.g.,
freedom of thought) and (b) the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual
treatment or punishment.
Cet article remet en question le principe juridique classique voulant quaucun
droit, aucune libert6 garantis dans la Charte canadienne des droits et libertes
n'est absolu. Larticle 1 de la Charte est la source le plus souvent citde de ce
principe. Cependant, I'article ne fait qu'noncer la norme que I'Etat doit satisfaire
pour justifier une limite imposde a un droit ou a une libert6 garantis par la Charte,
il naffirme pas qu'il existe des limites qui satisfont a cette norme pour tous les
droits et toutes les libertds garantis par la Charte. Si cette interpretation est
correcte, elle ne rend pas automatiquement absolu l'un des droits ou Iune des
libertds garantis par la Charte. En effet, la norme 6noncde dans l'article 1 pourrait
6ventuellement englober tous ces droits et toutes ces libertds. Lauteur propose
ndanmoins deux elements qui pourraient 6tre considdrds comme 6tant absolus :
(a) les libertds qui concernent le for intbrieur d'une personne (p. ex. la libert6 de
pensde) et (b) le droit de ne pas 6tre soumis a des peines ou a des traitements
cruels et inhabituels.
* Doctor of Civil Law Candidate, McGill University. This paper sprung from a presentation I gave
at the 2016 Osgoode Hall Graduate Law Student Conference at Osgoode Hall Law School (York
University) in Toronto.
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Introduction
I. Emergence of the non-absolute principle
II. A better interpretation ofsection 1
III. Candidates for "absolute" status
Conclusion
The Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set
out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society.
Introduction
It is a well-established principle that no right or freedom guaranteed
by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is absolute. In other
words, all Charter rights and freedoms can be limited by the state. In
this paper, I challenge this principle. I argue that the text of the Charter
does not foreclose absolute Charter rights and freedoms. The question
of which Charter rights and freedoms (if any) are absolute if my textual
interpretation is correct is a separate matter on which I offer preliminary
reflections.
The most commonly cited basis for the "non-absolute" principle is
section 1 of the Charter, the omnibus limitation clause at the beginning of
the document (reproduced in full at the beginning of this article). Section 1
"guarantees" the rights and freedoms in the Charter "subject only to such
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a
free and democratic society."2 The drafting history of the Charter as well
as Charter scholarship and jurisprudence generally conclude that section 1
confirms the non-absolute nature of all Charter rights and freedoms.
Yet the text of section 1 does not confirm the existence of limits to
each and every Charter right and freedom. Neither does the legal test that
governs the application of section 1 (the so-called Oakes test). Section
1 simply sets a standard for when limits on these rights and freedoms
may be imposed (limits must be "reasonable," "prescribed by law," and
"demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society"). Section 1 does
1. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 1, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
2. Ibid.
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not say that this standard can or will definitively be satisfied. Yet section
1 has been interpreted as confirming in advance, in respect of all Charter
rights and freedoms, the existence of limits conforming to that standard.
We have, in this way, jumped the gun on absolute Charter rights and
freedoms and made a false start.
It may very well be that, ultimately, no Charter right or freedom is
absolute. Many Charter rights and freedoms have been found to have
limits conforming to the standard in section 1. However, the text of the
Charter does not prejudge this issue. Where a breach of a Charter right
or freedom occurs it is for the state to justify that the breach satisfies the
section 1 standard. Section 1 does not preclude the possibility that this
standard, in respect of a given Charter right or freedom, may never be
satisfied. In this paper I nominate two candidates for "absolute" status:
(1) freedoms concerning the internal forum of the person (e.g., freedom
of thought) and (2) the right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual
treatment or punishment.
Part I ofthis paper traces the emergence ofthe principle that no Charter
right or freedom is absolute within the drafting history of the Charter as
well as Charter jurisprudence and legal scholarship. Part II outlines what
I submit is the better interpretation of section 1 and certain ramifications
of that interpretation. Part III identifies the Charter rights and freedoms
that may be candidates for "absolute" status should my interpretation of
section 1 be accepted.
Looking forward, this paper invites legal scholars in all fields to take
a closer look at conventional legal wisdom that, like the non-absolute
principle in the Charter, has escaped serious scrutiny and has come to be
taken for granted.
I. Emergence of the non-absolute principle
In February 1968, then Minister of Justice Pierre Elliott Trudeau presented
a policy paper entitled "A Canadian Charter of Human Rights" to a first
ministers' conference in Ottawa. The policy paper advocated for adding a
bill of rights to the Canadian Constitution and presented what became the
first draft ofthe Charter. While the drafting history ofthe Charter generally
favours the conventional wisdom that has developed around absolute
Charter rights and freedoms, Trudeau made room for absolute rights in
his policy paper. In the context of discussing freedom of conscience and
religion, Trudeau wrote this:
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Freedom with respect to the individual's internal belief or conscience
might well be considered absolute and not qualified in any way. It is the
external manifestation of the exercise or furtherance of beliefs which
may give rise to problems and the need for limitations in the interest of
public safety and order.3
This may be the only statement made in support of absolute rights during
the drafting of the Charter. Trudeau suggests that freedom concerning
the internal forum of the person might be absolute. The internal forum
implicates Charter rights such as freedom of thought and belief guaranteed
by section 2(b) and freedom of conscience guaranteed by section 2(a).
Aside from this statement in Trudeau's 1968 policy paper, the drafting
history of the Charter supports the conventional wisdom in Charter
interpretation that no right or freedom guaranteed by the Charter is absolute.
The 1972 Final Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and
House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada recommended that
the "rights and freedoms recognized by the Bill of Rights should not be
interpreted as absolute and unlimited, but should rather be exercisable to
the extent that they are reasonably justifiable in a democratic society."4
In academic circles, the non-absolute status of Charter rights and
freedoms has, to my knowledge, never been seriously questioned. Writing
in 1982, shortly after the Charter came into force, Peter Hogg wrote that
section 1 "guarantees the rights and freedoms" in the Charter "but makes
clear that they are not absolutes."' The non-absolute nature of Charter
rights and freedoms is often described as uncontroversial and obvious:
Although [the Charter] purports to guarantee rights, the symbolism
implied in this word is unfortunate. Common sense dictates that rights
cannot possibly be absolute. In a civilized society we can no more
embrace the idea that liberty allows people to act in any manner they wish
than we can give sanction to murder as a protected form of expression.6
The first reference to the non-absolute nature of Charter rights and freedoms
by the Supreme Court of Canada appears in Operation Dismantle v. The
Queen, a 1985 decision concerning the Canadian government's decision to
3. The Hon Pierre Elliott Trudeau (Minister of Justice), A Canadian Charter of Human Rights
(Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1968) at 18.
4. Anne F Bayefsky, Canada s Constitution Act 1982 & Amendments: A Documentary History
(Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1989) at 239. Also see 423 and 662.
5. Peter W Hogg, Canada Act 1982Annotated (Toronto: Carswell, 1982) at 10.
6. Janet Hiebert, Limiting Rights: The Dilemma ofJudicial Review (Montreal: McGill-Queen's
University Press, 1996) at 150 [emphasis in original].
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allow U.S. cruise missile testing on Canadian soil.' The claimants argued
that this practice increased the risk of nuclear war and, should that risk
materialize, Canada would be a more likely target for a nuclear attack.
The claimants argued that this scenario unjustifiably infringed section 7 of
the Charter, which guarantees "the right to life, liberty and security of the
person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with
the principles of fundamental justice."' The Court dismissed the section 7
claim.
Justice Bertha Wilson, writing for herself in Operation Dismantle,
commented on absolute rights and freedoms in the Charter. In the course of
considering section 7, she concluded that this right cannot be absolute and
opined that "the right to liberty, which I take to be the right to pursue one's
goals free of governmental constraint, must accommodate the corresponding
rights of others." 9 She then discussed what the concept of a "right" is for
the purposes of the Charter, quoting American philosopher Mortimer Adler:
Living in organized societies under effective government and enforceable
laws, as they must in order to survive and prosper, human beings neither
have autonomy nor are they entitled to unlimited liberty of action.
Autonomy is incompatible with organized society. Unlimited liberty is
destructive of it.'o
Shortly after, and somewhat out of the blue, Wilson J. noted that the "rights
under the Charter not being absolute, their content or scope must be
discerned quite apart from any limitation sought to be imposed upon them
by the government under s. 1."n Thus, Wilson J. does not rely on section 1
to conclude that all Charter rights and freedoms are non-absolute. Rather,
she relies on conditions that she believes are required for an organized
society ruled by government and law (in the words ofAdler, the absence of
"autonomy" and "unlimited liberty"). To use a phrase that has appeared in
Charter jurisprudence from time to time, Wilson J. seems to suggest that
all Charter rights and freedoms have "internal limits" aside from whether
the state-imposed limit on the right or freedom satisfies the standard in
section 1 of the Charter. It may be problematic, however, to apply the
"internal limits" principle to all Charter rights and freedoms. The text of
certain rights and freedoms lends itself to this principle easily, while the
7. Operation Dismantle v The Queen, [1985] 1 SCR 441, 18 DLR (4th) 481 (cited to SCR) [Operation
Dismantle].
8. Charter, supra note 1 at s 7.
9. Operation Dismantle, supra note 7 at 488.
10. Ibid at 488-489, citing Mortimer J Adler, Six Great Ideas (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co,
1981) at 144.
11. Operation Dismantle, ibid at 489.
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text of others does not. The "right to be secure against unreasonable search
and seizure" in section 8 has an internal limit (the reasonableness of the
search or seizure) whereas "freedom of thought" in section 2(b) does not.
The analysis of Wilson J. concerning absolute Charter rights and
freedoms has been scarcely cited in subsequent jurisprudence.12 This is
most likely the case because the approach of finding internal limits to
Charter rights and freedoms (where such limits are not explicitly provided
by the text) has not enjoyed much purchase in Charter jurisprudence. The
preferred approach has been to leave the questions of limits on Charter
rights and freedoms to section 1:
Although a Charter right is defined broadly, generally without internal
limits, the Charter recognizes, under s. 1, that social values will at times
conflict and that some limits must be placed even on fundamental rights. 3
The basis for asserting the non-existence of absolute Charter rights and
freedoms in Canadian jurisprudence has almost universally rested on
section 1. An early example of this reasoning appears in a 1983 decision
of the Ontario Court of Appeal, which held that an extradition order
against a Canadian citizen to the Federal Republic of Germany violated
the right of a Canadian citizen to remain in Canada (as guaranteed by
section 6(1) of the Charter) but that it satisfied the section 1 standard. 4
In discussing section 1, the Court held that "it is recognized that the listed
rights and freedoms [in the Charter] are never absolute and that there are
always qualifications and limitations to allow for the protection of other
competing interests in a democratic society.""
Many Supreme Court of Canada decisions have affirmed the non-
absolute nature of Charter rights and freedoms on the basis of section 1.
The Court did so in R v. Oakes, a 1986 decision that outlined the legal test
for section 1, with these words:
The rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter are not, however,
absolute. It may become necessary to limit rights and freedoms in
circumstances where their exercise would be inimical to the realization
of collective goals of fundamental importance. For this reason, s. 1
provides criteria of justification for limits on the rights and freedoms
12. One of the few references is by Wilson J herself in The Queen v Jones, [1986] 2 SCR 284, 31 DLR
(4th) 569 at 314.
13. Hill v Church ofScientology ofToronto, [1995] 2 SCR 1130, 126 DLR (4th) 129 at 1173.
14. Germany (FederalRepublic) vRauca (1983), 41 OR (2d) 225, 4 CCC (3d) 385 (CA) (cited to
CCC) [Federal Republic].
15. Ibid at 401. Wilson J cites Federal Republic in Operation Dismantle, but not for the proposition
that the non-existence of absolute Charter rights and freedoms is confirmed by section 1.
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guaranteed by the Charter.16
There are several other instances in which the Supreme Court has affirmed
the non-absolute nature of all Charter rights and freedoms (not to mention
lower Canadian courts)." This principle has, to my knowledge, never been
subjected to serious scrutiny or challenge.
The conventional wisdom that all Charter rights and freedoms are non-
absolute on account of section 1 is understandable given that the text of
the Charter begins with a single, omnibus limiting provision followed by
the rights and freedoms. This arrangement gives the structural impression
that all Charter rights and freedoms are affected by section 1 in the same
way (the Oakes test gives the same impression). But this one-size-fits-
all approach overlooks the fact that not all rights and freedoms are made
equal-they protect different values and interests, some of which are
arguably more vital than others to a free and democratic society. In a 1987
decision, the Supreme Court of Canada held that "the Charter protects a
complex of interacting values, each more or less fundamental to the free
and democratic society that is Canada.""
In my view, the principle that no Charter right or freedom is absolute
stems from a misreading of section 1 of the Charter, the provision that
has been most often cited as the legal basis for the principle. I now turn to
how this provision should, in my view, be interpreted with respect to the
limitability of Charter rights and freedoms.
II. A better interpretation ofsection ]
Section 1 of the Charter declares: "The Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to
such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified
in a free and democratic society."1 9 During the drafting of the Charter,
an earlier version of section 1 read as follows: "The Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms recognizes the following rights and freedoms
subject only to such reasonable limits as are generally accepted in a free
and democratic society with a parliamentary system of government."2 0
This version was criticized for "making it too easy for governments to
16. R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103, 26 DLR (4th) 200 at 136 (cited to SCR) [Oakes].
17. See, for example, Sauve v Canada (ChiefElectoral Officer), 2002 SCC 68, [2002] 3 SCR 519 at
para 84; Edmonton Journal vAlberta (Attorney General), [1989] 2 SCR 1326, 64 DLR (4th) 577 at 1373
[Edmonton Journal cited to SCR]; Rv Nikal, [1996] 1 SCR 1013, 133 DLR (4th) 658 at 1057; Charkaoui
v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 SCC 9, [2007] 1 SCR 350 at para 66 [Charkaoui].
18. Rv Lyons, [1987] 2 SCR 309,44 DLR (4th) 193 at 326.
19. Charter, supra note 1 at s 1.
20. Bayefsky, supra note 4 at 704. An even earlier version of section 1 omitted the phrase "with a
parliamentary system of government" (see 669).
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restrict the rights and freedoms."2 1 The language of the final version of
section 1 "was intended to narrow the limits that could be placed on those
rights and freedoms which were guaranteed."2 2
While section 1 is often cited as the basis for the non-existence of
absolute Charter rights and freedoms, the provision does not explicitly
confirm this point. It merely declares that Charter rights and freedoms
are guaranteed with the qualification that they may be limited by the
state if the limit is "reasonable" and "demonstrably justified in a free
and democratic society." This standard may or may not be satisfied when
the state breaches a Charter right or freedom. In other words, section 1
does not read as follows (or as something to this effect): The rights and
freedoms guaranteed in this Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms are
subject to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society, limits ofwhich kind exist for all
these rights and freedoms. Yet this is the prevailing interpretation given
to section 1-i.e., limits of the kind described in section 1 in fact exist in
respect of all Charter rights and freedoms (though the precise nature and
extent of these limits remains unknown).
Section 1, however, does not purport to provide advance confirmation
that limits satisfying the standard set out in the provision exist in respect
of all Charter rights and freedoms. Whether that is so is for time and
circumstance to tell. A better interpretation of section 1 is that Charter
rights and freedoms may be limited where the limits are prescribed by law,
reasonable, and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society
but-and this is important-it is not a foregone conclusion that each and
every Charter right and freedom will attract such limits.
That section 1 does not preclude absolute Charter rights and freedoms
is supported by the phrase "demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society" in two respects. First, the word "demonstrably" supports the
notion that it is for the state to prove-to demonstrate-that a limitation
of a Charter right and freedom meets the standard of being justified in a
free and democratic society. By interpreting section 1 in a manner that
confirms in advance the limitability of all Charter rights and freedoms (and
thus excludes the possibility of absolute Charter rights and freedoms), an
aspect of the state's justificatory burden under section 1 is lifted. In other
words, part of the state's burden under section 1 is to demonstrate that the
21. Morris Manning, Rights, Freedoms and the Courts: A PracticalAnalysis ofthe Constitution Act,
1982 (Toronto: Emond-Montgomery, 1983) at 149.
22. Ibid.
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Charter right or freedom in question is even subject to the sort of limits
articulated in the provision.
One of the contributing factors to the current interpretation of section
1 regarding absolute Charter rights and freedoms may be the neglect of
the "free and democratic society" phrase in the provision. The Oakes test
for section 1 sheds little light on the meaning of this phrase, which is
the "ultimate standard" against which limitations of Charter rights and
freedoms must be "demonstrably justified."2 3 The Oakes test itself makes
no reference to this standard; it is mainly concerned with ascertaining
whether limits of Charter rights and freedoms are reasonable, which is a
distinct element of the standard set out in section 1.
Accepting the interpretation of section 1 that I advance would not
automatically render certain Charter rights and freedoms absolute.
Accepting this interpretation would, however, have two obvious
ramifications. The first is it would open the door to the possibility of finding
certain Charter rights and freedoms absolute. If a given Charter right or
freedom is eventually declared absolute the state would not be entitled
to attempt to justify a breach of that right or freedom. If, for example,
freedom of thought were declared absolute, a claimant would simply
have to establish that the state has breached this freedom. If a breach is
established, the case is closed. The freedom's absolute status would dictate
the result of the section 1 analysis.
The second ramification of accepting the interpretation of section
1 that I advance builds on the materialization of the first ramification.
Should certain Charter rights and freedoms be declared absolute, this
might challenge the well-established principle that there is no "hierarchy"
of Charter rights and freedoms. The rubber hits the road for this principle
where there is a conflict between Charter rights and freedoms. In this
scenario, courts are required to conduct a balancing act and seek a
reconciliation of the conflict:
A hierarchical approach to rights, which places some over others, must
be avoided, both when interpreting the Charter and when developing the
common law. When the protected rights of two individuals come into
conflict... Charter principles require a balance to be achieved that fully
respects the importance of both sets of rights.24
23. Oakes, supra note 16 at 136. Dickson CJ identified some "values and principles essential to
a free and democratic society," including "respect for the inherent dignity of the human person,
commitment to social justice and equality, accommodation of a wide variety of beliefs, respect for
cultural and group identity, and faith in social and political institutions which enhance the participation
of individuals and groups in society."
24. Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting Corp, [1994] 3 SCR 835, 120 DLR (4th) 12 at 877.
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The non-hierarchical approach to Charter rights and freedoms would be
unsettled even if one Charter right or freedom is declared absolute. Such
a declaration would create an inescapable hierarchy between absolute
and non-absolute rights and freedoms. The approach that the Court has
developed for reconciling (non-absolute) Charter rights and freedoms
when they come into conflict may not apply to a conflict between an
absolute right and a non-absolute right. Were such a conflict to arise, the
case for preferring an absolute right to a non-absolute right may be more
compelling than preferring a non-absolute right to another non-absolute
right.
This thought experiment presupposes the existence of at least one
absolute Charter right or freedom. In the next section I offer some
preliminary reflections on which Charter rights and freedoms may qualify
for "absolute" status.
III. Candidates for "absolute" status
If section 1 does not preclude absolute Charter rights and freedoms, which
rights and freedoms, if any, are candidates for "absolute" status? It may
very well be that no Charter right or freedom enjoys this status. I simply
argue that we cannot know at the outset-or even decades after the advent
of the Charter-that each and every Charter right and freedom is non-
absolute.
That said, I submit there are potential candidates for "absolute"
status. The right "not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment
or punishment" guaranteed by section 12 is one. In R v. Smith (Edward
Dewey), the appellant pleaded guilty to importing cocaine into Canada but
challenged the seven-year mandatory minimum sentence as contravening
certain of his Charter rights and freedoms, including his right to be free
from cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.25 The trial judge found that
the mandatory minimum sentence constituted cruel and unusual treatment
or punishment but nevertheless imposed a sentence of eight years in light
of the surrounding circumstances. The majority of the British Columbia
Court of Appeal reversed the trial judge's conclusion that the mandatory
minimum sentence violated section 12 of the Charter but maintained the
sentence of eight years. The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada
restored the trial judge's conclusion that the mandatory minimum sentence
violated section 12 and that this infringement of the accused's Charter
right could not be justified under section 1. Justice McIntyre dissented and
stated this with respect to section 12:
25. Rv Smith (Edward Dewey), [1987] 1 SCR 1045, 40 DLR (4th) 435 (cited to SCR) [Smith].
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Cruel and unusual treatment or punishment is treated as a special concept
in the Charter. The prohibition is in absolute terms. No discretion to
any sentencing authority is permitted, no exception to its application is
provided. In this, s. 12 differs from many other sections conferring rights
and benefits which speak of reasonable time, or without unreasonable
delay or reasonable bail, or without just cause. Section 12, in its terms
and in its intended application, is absolute and without qualification. It
may well be said that, in s. 12, the Charter has created an absolute right,
that is, a right to be free or exempt from cruel and unusual punishment. 26
In his subsequent discussion of section 12, McIntyre J. refers to the right
as an "absolute constitutional prohibition," 2 7 an "absolute right," 28 and an
"absolute prohibition." 29
One reason why the right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual
treatment or punishment may be more conducive to "absolute" status
is that it is one of the Charter rights and freedoms that features internal
limits. Another example is section 8, which guarantees "the right to be
secure against unreasonable search and seizure." In a 2009 decision of
the British Columbia Court of Appeal, Groberman JA. made this obiter
statement:
There are, of course, Charter provisions that do have internal limitations,
such that s. 1 justifications for infringements are no more than theoretical
possibilities-it is difficult, for example, to conceive of a s. I justification
for an unreasonable search and seizure which violates s. 8 of the
Charter.30
At first blush, this statement does not appear revolutionary. Yet Groberman
J.A. suggests that section 8, by virtue of having an internal limit, provides
an absolute right. A violation of section 8, Groberman J.A. suggests, may
never be justifiable under section 1. Other Charter rights with internal
limits include the right "not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned"
(section 9), rights upon arrest or detention (section 10),31 and rights in
26. Ibid at 1085.
27. Ibid at 1090.
28. Ibid at 1091.
29. Ibid at 1108. See also R v Daniels, 1990 CanLII 7612, [1990] 4 CNLR 51 (SKQB), in which
Wedge J, after referring to the judgment of McIntyre J in Smith, noted that it "seems implicit in this
case and others that s. 12 confers an absolute right and may not be saved by s. 1 of the Charter" (para
25).
30. McIvor v. Canada (Registrar ofIndian and Northern Affairs), 2009 BCCA 153, 306 DLR (4th)
193 at para 115.
31. Charter, supra note 1, s 10 ("Everyone has the right on arrest or detention" to, inter alia,
"be informed promptly of the reasons therefor" and "to retain and instruct counsel without delay"
[emphasis added]).
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the context of criminal proceedings (section 11).32 Section 11 of the
Charter also guarantees rights without internal limits. An example
is s. 11(i), which guarantees a person guilty of an offence the lesser
punishment where the punishment has changed between the offence
date and the sentencing date. Noting the "unequivocal" wording of
this right, Abella J. of the Supreme Court of Canada opined (in dissent)
that the "absolutist language" of section 11(i) "must colour the s. 1
analysis by demanding the most stringent ofjustifications."3
Section 7 is another example of a Charter right or freedom that
features internal limits; it not only protects the "right to life, liberty, and
security of the person" but also "the right not to be deprived" of these
interests "except in accordance with the principles of fundamental
justice." Just as it is difficult to imagine a section 1 justification for an
unreasonable search and seizure with respect to section 8, it is equally
difficult to imagine a section 1 justification for a deprivation of a
person's life, liberty, or security of the person that is not in accordance
with the principles of fundamental justice. The Supreme Court of
Canada has held that "it is hard to justify a law that runs afoul of the
principles of fundamental justice and is thus inherently flawed."34 In
short, "violations of s. 7 are not easily saved by s. 1."35
Aside from the right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual
treatment or punishment, I believe Charter rights and freedoms that
deal exclusively with the internal forum of the person are candidates
for absolute status. Here I have in mind freedom of thought, belief,
and opinion under section 2(b) of the Charter. Freedom of conscience
under section 2(a), to the extent that it protects the internal forum, is
also a candidate. I referred earlier to the 1968 policy paper of Pierre
Trudeau containing what turned out to be the first draft of the Charter.
I agree with Trudeau that freedom "with respect to the individual's
internal belief or conscience might well be considered absolute and
not qualified in any way."3 6 When would it be "reasonable" and
"demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society" to limit
personal thoughts and beliefs as distinct from the manifestation
32. Ibid, s 11 ("Any person charged with an offence has the right" to, inter alia, "be informed
without unreasonable delay of the specific offence," "to be tried within a reasonable time," "to
be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an
independent and impartial tribunal," and "not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause"
[emphasis added]).
33. Rv KRJ, 2016 SCC 31 atparas 123-124 (Abella J).
34. Carter v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5, [2015] 1 SCR 331 atpara 95.
35. Charkaoui, supra note 17 at para66.
36. Trudeau, supra note 3 at 18.
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ofthose thoughts and beliefs by acts or omission? In a labour law arbitration
ruling in Ontario, the arbitrator noted that the "right of freedom of thought
(but not the freedom to act on thought) may be a right that has no limits-
at least at present."3 7 Prosecution of thought crimes hearkens back to
totalitarian regimes during the 20th century and their representation by
Orwell in 1984 through the Thought Police that monitor the thoughts of
citizens for opposition to the ruling party's authority or ideology.38
To date, the Supreme Court of Canada has gone no further than
saying that the freedom to hold beliefs is broader than the right to act on
those beliefs. The Court made this point in a 2001 case in the context of
section 2(a), which guarantees freedom of conscience and religion. The
Court held that the "freedom to hold beliefs is broader than the freedom
to act on them."3 9 In an earlier decision, the Court held that "although the
freedom of belief may be broad, the freedom to act upon those beliefs
is considerably narrower."" That the Court has gone no further than to
say that freedom with respect to the internal forum is "broader" than
the freedom to manifest by action what the person entertains within this
forum is not surprising given the well-established non-absolute approach
to Charter rights and freedoms.
For comparative purposes, the European Convention on Human
Rights appears to grant absolute status to internal forum rights." Article 9
of the Convention provides the following:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief
and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or
private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice
and observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only
to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection
of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.
37. La-Z-Boy Canada Limited v Communications Workers of America, Local 80400 JUE, 2005
CanLII 56336 (ON LA) at para 23.
38. George Orwell, 1984 (London: Secker & Warburg, 1949).
39. Trinity Western University v College of Teachers, 2001 SCC 31, [2001] 1 SCR 772 at para 36.
40. B (R) v Children sAid Society ofMetropolitan Toronto, [1995] 1 SCR 315, 122 DLR (4th) 1 at
435.
41. Convention for the Protection ofHuman Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950,
213 UNTS 221 at 223, Eur TS 5. The Convention is structured differently from the Charter insofar
that it does not feature a single limiting provision akin to section 1. Instead, nearly every right in
the Convention is declared and is immediately followed by a limiting provision. Notably, Article 3
(prohibition of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) is not accompanied by a
limiting provision and is thus an absolute right.
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The limiting provision-Article 9(2)-only refers to limitations of the
freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs. No reference is made to the
limitation of the thoughts or beliefs themselves (i.e., the internal forum).
Article 9 has, for this reason, been interpreted as guaranteeing an absolute
right with respect to the internal dimension of freedom of thought,
conscience, and religion. 4 2
I reiterate that I do not propose that any Charter right and freedom
is in fact absolute-my central point is that the text of the Charter (and
particularly section 1) does not preclude the existence of absolute Charter
rights and freedoms. By identifying certain Charter rights and freedoms
for which an argument of absolute status could be advanced I am simply
flagging potential avenues of deeper inquiry should my central point about
section 1 be accepted.
Conclusion
Courts, legal academics, and lawyers in Canada have jumped the gun on
what section 1 says with respect to absolute rights and freedoms in the
Charter. The legal profession has accepted the non-existence of absolute
Charter rights and freedoms without critical reflection. Today, the principle
that no Charter right or freedom is absolute is taken for granted.
Absolute rights and freedoms cause concern because the state cannot
limit them. There is also a floodgates concern with respect to such rights.
Declaring a Charter right or freedom absolute may also be an irreversible
step. It is difficult to conceive of absolute status being changeable, such
that a Charter right or freedom could shift over time from absolute to non-
absolute status or vice versa. Absoluteness (or non-absoluteness) may very
well be an immutable and intrinsic definitional characteristic of the right
in question.43
These concerns, however, should neither dictate the answer to the
question of absolute Charter rights and freedoms nor preclude discussion
of absolute Charter rights and freedoms. This issue is important because
it concerns the full meaning of these rights and freedoms. By taking non-
absoluteness of Charter rights and freedoms as the starting point for the
analysis of whether a breach of a Charter right or freedom is justified under
section 1, we have already-and, I argue, prematurely-curtailed the scope
42. R v Secretary ofState for Education and Employment exparte Williamson, [2005] UKHL 15, 2
AC 246 at para 16 (Bingham J).
43. However, if the "absolute" status of a Charter right or freedom hinges on whether it is justified
to limit the right or freedom at all in a "free and democratic society," it is arguable that the absolute
vs non-absolute status could shift in conjunction with the evolution of what constitutes a "free and
democratic society" (assuming that this concept is capable of evolution).
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of the right or freedom in a manner that lessens the state's justificatory
burden. Starting, instead, from the posture of the potential absoluteness
of Charter rights and freedoms is not only correct as a matter of statutory
interpretation. It also better ensures that these and rights and freedoms will
receive the "liberal, contextual, and purposive interpretation" often called
for by the Supreme Court of Canada."
Ultimately, all Charter rights and freedoms may be subject to limits.
The non-absolute principle that prevails in Charter discourse may,
in the final analysis, hold true. But given what is at stake-namely the
scope of these rights and freedoms-it is crucially important that careful
consideration be devoted to this issue. To date, the non-absolute principle
has been unchallenged despite the absence of a textual basis in the Charter
provision cited as authority for it. There was a false start on absolute
Charter rights and freedoms-we have jumped the gun on this issue. With
this paper, I am calling for a return to the starting line.
Placing the principle of non-absolute Charter rights and freedoms
under the microscope invites reflection on how quickly and firmly
prevailing (but untested) wisdom can take hold in the law. It also invites
legal scholars in all fields to identify and scrutinize wisdom of this sort. As
this article has demonstrated, this exercise may lead us to reconsider our
conventional understanding of the law.
44. Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de lajeunesse) v Bombardier Inc
(Bombardier Aerospace Training Center), 2015 SCC 39, [2015] 2 SCR789 at para 31.

